The "Memoirs" of Thomas Donaldson

Dated 1878-1880

Washington, D.C., [Thursday] January, 1878.—I called with Senator J. H. Mitchell, of Oregon, on Attorney General Charles Devens. We were urging the re-appointment of a faithful officer in Idaho, when Devens said: "You must remember Mr. Edmunds is a very critical man." Mr. Edmunds was Chairman of the Senate Judiciary [Committee], and had recently laid some of Mr. Devens’ appointments aside. He repeated this, when the Senator answered sharply, "Yes; but a very just one." Devens drew down the corner of his mouth, and made no reply.

Washington, D.C., [Thursday] January 31, 1878.—I was with President Hayes half an hour this morning and we drifted into [discussing] finance. I tried to stiffen him up to the point of vetoing the Bland Bill, by urging that he was put in as President to check the vagaries of politicians—to which he agreed. These financial epidemics were like sporadic fevers; and tracing the history of the different financial movements for fifteen years, I said: "If this succeeds, the next step will be—" President Hayes added "Repudiation, but not in our day." He then talked some time about the agreement of leading men of finance on a double metallic currency. This made me think that he is intending to approve the Bland Bill. The talk was not assuring.

I then said to him that in my opinion more currency or current money would be secreted and hoarded by persons through fear of what was to come, if the Silver bill passed, than would be coined in silver in two years, and the volume of circulation would be much reduced thereby.

Philadelphia, Pa., [Monday] February 4, 1878.—Captain John Lucas, [Pottsville, Pa.] called on me this morning. He is an applicant for the Consulship at Manchester, [England]. He repeated to me what Senator [J.] Don Cameron said to him last week in Washington. Cameron endorsed his papers but refused to go and see Mr. Evarts for him, saying: "I want nothing to do with him. I am a Republican and I shall ask no favors from such a man as he is." Lucas said that President Hayes told him, in relation to the matter, that he left such things to Mr. Evarts.

Washington, D.C., [Wednesday] February 27, 1878.—I had ex-Senator T[homas] W[ard] Osborn, of Florida, to supper with me. [Osborn served as U.S. Commissioner at the Centennial Exposition in Philadelphia in 1876]. He detailed to me how Florida was carried for President Hayes. I had gotten R[ichard] C. McCormick to aid in sending him from Philadelphia to Florida, November 10, 1876. McCormick told Osborn that he had telegrams from Hayes, also [from] Jay Gould, asking him to send Osborn to Florida. He showed me the dispatch from Gould, November 15, 1876.

Governor McCormick gave him [Osborn] $100, and he started, stopping on his way in Washington to see Alphonso Taft, the Attorney General. He saw Taft, who promised him the aid of the judiciary, and asked him to report every day to him on the condition of affairs; all of which he did. On his arrival in Tallahassee he met W[illiam] E. Chandler and ex-Governor Ed[ward] F. Noyes, of Ohio, who was close to Hayes.

The story of how Florida was carried for the Republicans in 1876 is this, Osborn said: one L. G. Dennis was a State Senator from Alachua County, in which was Archer precinct No. 2 (a Republican precinct). When the polls closed the Democrats got the judges to make the [precinct] returns show a Democratic majority of fifty votes. Dennis found this out. He then forced, persuaded and scared the election judges into adding 100 Republican votes to the returns, so that the majority became Republican. Fifty votes, he said, to balance the other fraud, and fifty to pay the Democratic thieves off. So the returns of Archer precinct No. 2 came in a Republican majority.

The Democratic visiting statesmen, headed by Manton Marble, got wind of this, and the fellows who made the alterations were put on the stand. At first they told the truth, and then afterwards got drunk and told another story, which was false. Governor Hayes demanded on behalf of the Republicans that Dennis go on the stand. This he refused to do as he did not want Hayes to lose the State nor his acts to be found out. [L. G. Dennis later appeared before the Select Committee on Alleged Frauds in the Presidential Election of 1876 in Washington, D.C., on June 27-29, 1878].

The judges of the precinct who made the alteration were [Richard H.] Black and Green [R. Moore]. Black was brought north and given a place in the Custom House in Philadelphia in 1877. I have a letter in my effects to that purpose. Green was shot by the rebels, and was given a place in the Post Office Department at Washington, in 1877.

Governor Noyes promised that Dennis should be taken care of. While the whole thing was going on in Florida, Osborn would ask Noyes whether Hayes would keep Republican faith and protect the Republicans who were carrying the State for him. Noyes would only say, "He has heretofore been a good party man. I hope he will!" The Republicans of Florida were in a dangerous position and knew that their leaders must fly the State.

After President Hayes was inaugurated, Dennis, having left Florida, called to see him in Washington, and demanded recognition. President Hayes took a book out of his pocket and said, "I know of you. You are to be taken care of. You are a hard-working Republican and virtually in exile; so go and pick out the place you want and I will give it to you. Go and see Sherman." Dennis saw Sherman, and the place he selected was found to be promised, so he returned to Hayes who had Sherman give him a place in the Internal Revenue Bureau. After they gave him the place, they granted him a leave of absence, and he returned to Massachusetts where his wife had been for several months. Getting tired of doing nothing and being paid for it, he came to Washington, resigned, and demanded recognition by appointment to a respectable office. Hayes said "Yes," and three times gave him notes to Sherman, who said "Yes; but come again." Finally, after presenting this fourth note, Sherman tried the same thing on him; but Dennis put the note in his pocket, saying, "Excuse me, I am tired of this." Sherman then appointed him a special agent of the Treasury.

Osborn, a man of the highest character, knew all of the above to be true, and added further, "Dennis must have Tilden’s assurance of protection if the worst comes to the worst."

Washington, D.C., [Thursday] February 28, 1878.—I stood talking with ex-Senator M[organ] C[alvin] Hamilton, of Texas, and A[ugustus] W[illiam] Cutler, M.C. of New Jersey, when Cutler said that Tilden had taken the oath of office as President in New York, at the same time Hayes took it here. (not so). I said that the Democrats expected, when they got the next Congress, to turn Mr. Hayes out and put Mr. Tilden in. Hamilton agreed, and said that the Democrats when they got in would reorganize the Supreme Court so as to decide the constitutional amendments illegal, and, as he said, "take the country to hell." Hamilton also said that Hayes’ policy in the South was not only weak, but powerful weak.

Washington, D.C., [Saturday] March 2, 1878.—I walked up Pennsylvania Avenue with Samuel Shellabarger, of Ohio, to-day. I asked him—as the House of Representatives in March, 1877, had passed a resolution that Tilden and Hendricks were President and Vice President for 4 years beginning March 4th, 1877, and as the Senate would be Democratic in March 1879, and as Tilden was said to have been sworn in March 1877 in New York — what then was to prevent the 46th Congress, which would be very largely Democratic, from sending their bills to Tilden for signature as President? Would not this be a peaceful Revolution, and could it be prevented, and would not Pres’t. Hayes be out? He answered, "Yes;" that a week ago Geo. F. Edmunds, of Vermont, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee in the Senate, had put the very same question to him, and feared such action. Edmunds also said that if Hayes depended upon the grateful Southern Congressmen to hold him in [office], in such an event, he was leaning on a broken reed; as their actions in secret sessions convinced him that they would go against Hayes. I put the same question to Samuel J. Randall within twenty minutes, and he said nothing, only laughed. Randall denied that he knew that Tilden had qualified as President in March 1877.

I put the same question to Judge Rae of Missouri and Judge [David Browning] Culbertson of Texas, M.C., both Democrats, within an hour. They agreed it could be done and might be; Judge Rae of Mo. Said that Pres’t. Hayes was awfully mistaken in Southern sentiment; that the Democrats of Louisiana and South Carolina only were grateful, but of no other Southern State because they were not affected by the release of Military rule.

I walked down the Avenue with Col. [Thomas Montague] Gunter, M.C. of Arkansas, a Democrat, who boasted that he had just had Republican Postmasters turned out in Fayetteville and in other towns in Arkansas, and Democrats put in. Culbertson said that he though Pres’t. Hayes was anxious to get out of the Presidency. He seemed to act so.

Samuel J. Randall told me during our conversation that, while the swap, as he called it, was going on which seated Gen’l Hayes as Pres’t., the men engaged in it kept clear of him, and did not let him know a word.

Washington, D.C., [Wednesday] March 6, 1878.—I was at the White House to-night one hour with President Hayes. He was chatty, and talked politics. I told him [of] my fears as to Democratic intentions regarding Tilden. He answered that perhaps they might not do it; he only wanted them to try; if they brought Tilden to Washington and tried to inaugurate him he would arrest him; that Tilden was not the man to do such a thing; besides within two weeks he had been scared nearly to death by the United States authorities (referring no doubt to the suit in United States Courts in New York on revenue account). I told him of Democrats, including Congressmen, coming face to face with him and then going out and abusing him; and called his attention to the fact that, as he became unpopular with his party, the Democrats would love him, expecting plunder.

After I urged him to call the leaders of the party around him for consultation, he said that he and the party were never as near together as now since he had been President; that we were all Republicans, bound together on a hard-money platform, and on this we would be successful.

Pres’t. Hayes said it was no wonder that the party differed with him; that there was in fact nothing vital for them to agree upon. It was to be expected, he said, that they would fight for post offices, etc. Yet a year ago he told me the future depended upon a party growing up in the South in favor of the education of the Blacks and a party against it.

He said the people were crazed with the silver mania, and he knew long ago that no one could prevent it; still, Conkling and Blaine, leaders of a great party, could only rally with themselves, 10 Republicans and 10 Democrats to vote against the bill. He took an envelope out of his pocket with the vote on it. He said the administration could do nothing in this matter; it had nothing to do with forming opinions or sentiments. If these great leaders could not stem the tide, how could he be expected to do so? He repeated that he and his party differed because there was nothing essential to agree upon. That any political movements of the Democrats of a national character would solidify the [Republican] party. That Governor [Francis T.] Nichol[l]s of Louisiana must pardon [T. C.] Anderson, and he believed he would. That the Nichol[l]s legislature tendered immunity for Anderson and the rest in a series of unsolicited resolutions which had been published; and, rising and going to a box of letter files, he said, "Nichol[l]s wrote me this letter as an additional guarantee of such action." The refusal to pardon [Anderson] would arouse the Republicans, Pres’t Hayes said.

I told the Pres’t. that 90 percent of his party was now against him. He answered that he had lately been reading the diary of John Quincy Adams, and that this period (opposition to a President by his own party) was like the time Adams was President. He thought that with a gold platform and honest money, and payment of the debt, we could carry some states not heretofore Republican, and lose some states heretofore Republican. Upon the whole the future was bright and he thought he could see a Republican successor to himself. He said it was too late to talk about treason, traitors, and rebels; that his action in the Louisiana case was simply logical; and that having let one state back into the Union we had to let them all back in. He said he was a bi-metalist, and was glad the Senate hurried his veto through, as the country was tired and expectant. He understood that Blaine and Conkling were in worse disagreement than ever. I asked him whether he had ever seen Evarts before he went into his Cabinet. In answer he said he knew nothing of him personally, and had only seen him once, and that was at Philadelphia on the fourth of July, 1876.

I spoke to him of the complaints against Evarts by the whole country, and that I had not heard a single person say a good word for him politically. I intimated that the whole country expected a change, and said that McCrary stood the best of any man in his Cabinet. He replied, "Yes, he is a good man; still, he is in a position not to anger any person by refusal; he has but little patronage." I urged that his reform in the Civil Service was a failure, and that Mr. Evarts and Mr. Schurz should go before the people of their respective counties and run for one legislature on the reform ticket. They would both be badly beaten, and no reform was possible unless a majority of Congress was elected that way; that his executive orders were of no account in the premises as they were not laws. He was cordial and very pleasant, and asked me to come again soon.

En route from Charlotte, N.C., to Philadelphia, Pa., [Sunday] March 10, 1878.—I met J[ames] B[everly] Sener, ex-Member of Congress [of Fredericksburg, Virginia] and a member of the National Republican Committee [in 1876] on the cars to-night, en route to Fredericksburg. He said that he was disgusted with Pres’t. Hayes; that he did not care how soon the Democrats got him out; and intimated that he was willing to help them. In the Cincinnati Convention of 1876 Sener bolted Blaine on the seventh ballot and took eight votes to Hayes — decisive votes. I saw him do this, and to-night asked him why he did so. He said that at or before the sixth ballot he went to the Massachusetts delegation and E. R. Hoar told him Blaine could not, if nominated, carry Massachusetts. This frightened Sener so much that returned to his delegation and got eight [of Virginia’s twenty-two] votes transferred to Hayes on the seventh ballot. Sener said he had never called upon Hayes since he became President, and never asked him for a favor. He considered his election a misfortune and regretted that he had ever voted for him.

President Hayes gave Sener an office after this, that of Chief Justice of Wyoming [confirmed December 18, 1879] and Sener became loyal. The President told me, however, in 1879 or 1880 that the appointment of Sener was a mistake and that he was sorry he had made it. How these great men differ!

Philadelphia, Pa., [Friday] April 12, 1878.—I met ex-Governor Alex[ander] Cummings, of Colorado, in T. W. Price’s store to-day. Cummings related a conversation [which he had had] with Roscoe Conkling in 1877. Just after the Electoral Commission action—say in May or June—Conkling got into the cars with Cummings at Washington, en route for Philadelphia. Conkling said that he knew that Hayes did not carry Louisiana; that his opinion was that the action of the Electoral Commission was a fraud in the matter of that state, and an unexpected one. He fought for the Electoral Commission law because he thought it the best way to settle the matter. Cummings said the country will hold the reported author of that bill (Edmunds) responsible after a while. "Oh, no," said Conkling. "Mr. Edmunds will not be called to account for his action on the bill, but for his action on the Commission." He continued: "How much better it would have been for the country and party for Tilden to have been declared President than Hayes. Tilden would have done just as Hayes has done, and such a policy from him would have set the country wild and ensured a Republican President in 1880."

Conkling expressed great contempt for the Louisiana Commissioner. He said he had a bill prepared which he should introduce [in Congress] to [settle] hereafter all these Presidential questions without the action of Congress. The bill would let but one set of returns come up to Congress, the States below to settle all questions.

Cummings believes that Conkling intended in his bill to show Hayes’ title to be bad. Conkling continued that the danger to Republican institutions and the country by reason of unauthorized and illegal action of making a man President who was not elected could not be estimated and never should be tolerated again. He spoke with the greatest contempt of the Hayes wing of Republican party.

After this conversation, Governor Cummings called on Mr. Evarts, on his return to Washington, and repeated the conversation. Mr. Evarts was much struck with it, and wanted to know if Gov. Cummings thought that Conkling intended to attach Hayes’ title. Cummings said, "Yes." "But," said Evarts, "he can’t get him out." He sent Gov. Cummings to President Hayes, who treated him indifferently, and Cummings did not tell him the conversation.

Cummings also spoke of having seen letters from Capt. A. E. Lee, Hayes’ private secretary [as governor], abusing Blaine both before and since the nomination, and claiming that the country was to be congratulated upon its escape from Blaine’s nomination and election. Also one letter written before the nomination that Hayes would not accept the nomination for Vice Presidency. This, Lee also told me at the Cincinnati convention. Cummings said Lee had Hayes initiated by proxy into the order of Native Americans in this city.

From this conversation, as reported, and from the conversation I had with James H[erron] Hopkins, M.C. [of Pennsylvania] in March, 1877, it would seem that Conkling and others thought that T. W. Ferry (Vice Pres.) would declare Hayes elected and Grant would inaugurate him; and that the way to circumvent it was to originate and pass the Commission bill, get himself on it, and let the Commission throw out Louisiana and settle Hayes. This was the scheme, I have no doubt. Mr. Blaine is responsible for Conkling’s not being on the Commission; he kept him off by a battle in the caucus of Republican Senators. Mr. Blaine was then in the Senate.

Washington, D.C., [Thursday] April 18, 1878.—I was with President Hayes to-night for half an hour. He was pleasant but looked tired and used up. I told him I had read his platform in yesterday’s "New York Times," [Wednesday, April 17, 1878] and was pleased, but that it did not go far enough. He got up, went to a table, brought a scrap-book out, and said: "Garfield wrote it; it came out first in the Cleveland Herald. I saw it, cut it out and read it at a Cabinet meeting. I don’t know that the Cabinet approved it, come to think of it. They were all present when it was read, and most of them did say it was all right. I put this addition to it," showing me in pencil in his own hand, the last half clause: "That no Rebel War Claim should be paid or any person in the Rebellion receive a pension." I said to him: "I will go for all but the subsidies, and with the addition of a clause asserting that ‘this is a National Government and not a Confederacy.’" He said that he would approve that too.

The President said Republican platforms should have a clause denouncing the agitation by the Democrats of the questioning of the President’s title. I said nothing because I knew that 50 percent or more of the Republicans in Congress wanted him out. I found to-night, in talking with him, that he sometimes got impressions from the man who spoke first which lasted, and that with his Cabinet the man best recommended and not pushed seldom if ever got the office. He spoke of Justine Colburn, just appointed [April 3, 1878] as Consul General to Mexico. He said, "I gave this poor fellow the place, as he is very ill with consumption, and they, the Senators, vented their wrath against the N.Y. Times of which he is the Washington Correspondent, by rejecting him." [Rejected April 16; confirmed April 23, 1878]. He said, however, that he understood that the Senators talked of reconsidering the vote and confirming him. He said that he had had 5 appointments rejected, some hung up, and all five had been reconsidered and confirmed.

He handed me a letter to McCormick, Commissioner General [of the Exposition at] Paris, asking that he appoint me a juror at Paris where I was going on a visit. It was kind in him, but I did not want any such place.

The President said the Idaho Territorial officials were a queer set, and intimated a bad set. His impression was undoubtedly given him by an enemy of those people. I did my best to clear his mind as to this.

Washington, D.C., [Friday] April 19, 1870 [1878].—The town talk is [Roscoe] Conkling’s interview in the "New York World" of yesterday [April 17, 1878]. I was with General R[obert] C. Schenck to-day, and brought in General John McNeil, of Missouri. Schenk said: "I want to shake hands with a man—and only one of two—who during the Rebellion killed a traitor." He referred to Genl Ben Butler and [John] McNeil. McNeil answered, "I am proud of the distinction." Schenck then turned on the Conkling interview. I said rumor has it that Conkling will not deny it, but he claims that the methods of telling his views is larceny; that there never was such an interview, but that it was written our [out] from many conversations at different times with friends. He did not deny but what he had said such things. "Yes," said Schenck, "when I was Minister to Brazil in 1852, I was associated with Jack [John S.] Pendleton of Culpepper [County], Virginia, then chargee [d’affaires] to the Argentine Confederation, in making treaties with Paraguay, Uruguay, etc. I took with me from Rio, among other books to read on the journey to Buenos Aires, a copy of the then new and much read ‘Uncle Tom’s Cabin.’ After I arrived, Pendleton asked for some new books. I gave him this one. He laid down upon a lounge and read it through during the day, never leaving off until he had finished it. Throwing it down excitedly, he said, ‘Schenck, that book is an infernal lie, yet I know it to be true.’

"He meant," said Schenck, "that he knew of his own knowledge that fact (isolated) to be true, but the connected story was not true. Just so with Conkling’s interview; it is all true, but not connectedly stated."

Genl. Schenck then spoke of Pres’t. Hayes. He said that in 1874, when over here (while Minister to England) he found the Republican party in the hands of a lot of weak, mamby-pamby, shilly-shally, cowardly politicians. When he got back to London, the Editor of the Anglo American Times asked him who would be Grant’s successor. Schenck answered, Governor Hayes, because he was the idol of this weak and mamby-pamby lot. Since Hayes’ election the editor has called his attention to the prophecy. He said to McNeil, "This young man (meaning me) and myself had the honor to be Chairman and Secretary of the Republican State Convention of 1867, which brought Mr. Hayes into public life."

To-day I met Colonel Drank De Kay [Union Veterans Union, New York] in a street car. He said to me: "I just met Senator Roscoe Conkling, who was driving out. I said to him, ‘Senator, you don’t intend to deny that interview in the New York World of April 17th, as to President Hayes, do you? Because you have said a great deal more than that to me.’ ‘No,’ he said, ‘but the manner of the publication—such an outrageous breach of trust. I supposed I was talking in private," I do not recall a newspaper interview in my time which had made such a serious sensation as this.

I met William E. Chandler, of New Hampshire, in the lower part of the House of Representatives to-day. He was most cordial. I incidentally mentioned President Hayes. He said: "Enough. I do not want to hear anything of him. I do not know him. I never heard of such a man." And he hurriedly walked away.

Philadelphia, Pa., [Friday] May 19, 1878.—I said to the President in April, 1877, "I have indignantly denied for you that you were a party to any bargains to make yourself President." He quickly replied, "This you can do with safety at all times." I then added, "Still, I believe that some of your indiscreet friends made swaps and bargains and have been keeping them."

Washington, D.C., [Tuesday] June 4, 1878.—I usually sat a moment with Charles [D.A.] Loeffler, the President’s doorkeeper at the outlet door of the office, until he took my card in. This day we chatted for a moment. He said, "When President Hayes first came here he saw everybody, even old women who wanted to be scrubbers, etc. Every kind and sort. He got over that. He sees most everybody now, however, but don’t spend much time with them. He is always good natured. General Grant used to look up sometimes, but not often, when I handed him a card, and say: ‘Oh, hell! I don’t want to see him."

Havre-De-Grace, Maryland, [Wednesday] June 5th, 1878.—On a [Presidential] fishing party* to the United States Fish Hatching Station, I noticed a remark made by Secretary [R. W.] Thompson of the Navy, at the dinner table which to me sounded ill-timed and harsh. Prof. [Spencer F.] Baird, referring to a steam ferry boat called the "Burlington," at League Island, was answered by Sec’y Thompson: "Yes, there were three suspicious circumstances connected with her purchase."

I notice among President Hayes’ Cabinet members that I had heard speak on the subject (Evarts, Devens, Schurz and Thompson), all thought that the Grant’s Administration and the Bureaus under it were corrupt. The four above named were machine reformers and seemed to think that they went into the Cabinet for the purpose of reforming somebody or something, and must do it whether or not there was reason or necessity for it.

The boys to-day got the ancient Secretary [Thompson] to fishing with hook and line and cork and bob. Webb [C.] Hayes [the President’s son], watching the waves ripple and bobbing the cork up and down, would call out, "Now pull, you have a bite." The Secretary would jerk and pull but never had a bite. Finally, he got up in disgust and went into the cabin on the barge where I found him reading Sir Walter Raleigh’s last letter to his wife. President Hayes, in speaking of him [the Secretary] to me, called him "Brother Thompson."

* The party consisted of Professor Baird, President Hayes, Secretary Thompson, General George A. Sheridan, Thomas Donaldson, Colonel J. W. Powell, Webb C. Hayes, E. Clarke, De B. Randolph Keim of the Philadelphia Press, and representatives of the Baltimore Sun and American.

Philadelphia, Pa., [Sunday] June 9, 1878.—I spent the evening of the 8th [7th], Friday, with Robert G. Ingersoll at his house in Washington, D.C. [25 La Fayette Square]. He was fearful of Pres’t. Hayes. He said that Pres’t. Hayes [as Governor of Ohio] wrote him a letter and asked him in 1876 to speak at Columbus, Ohio. He made a bloody shirt speech and Hayes, a listener, said "Go on, that’s the kind—make all you can of such. I consider Ohio a doubtful state." Mr. Blaine was also solicited to speak by Gov. Hayes.

Ingersoll predicted that Pres’t. Hayes would be turned out by the Democrats. He said, "Suppose a half dozen Democrats go up to the White House armed with old flint locks, and turn Hayes out, who is to prevent it?" Meaning that the Republicans would not defend him. He said he had no great ability or brains, and as to Evarts, Oh! he said that he personally would pay them all back for the insult they had put on him, and that President Hayes disliked him because bishops and clergymen had poisoned the President against him.

Col. Ingersoll commented that if Hayes was leaning on Genl. Sherman and the Army he was leaning on a broken reed.

[Washington, D.C., Thursday] June 13, 1878.—To-night I went with E[dward] T. Steel of Philadelphia to get the President to appoint S. Speakman of Philadelphia [as] consul at Ghent. Mr. Steel told the President that Mr. [Frederick W.] Seward, [Assistant Secretary of State] (to whom he had taken a note from the President some weeks before, asking that Mr. Steel be gratified) had said that he could almost assure him that the appointment asked [for] would soon be made and promotion would follow. The President laughingly said: "Now, don’t you be so sanguine about promotion. Mr. Seward has been so long in that slow State Department that months and years are to him quite soon and he knows not time. An old friend of mine, Col. Finlay of Ky., was here several months about a small matter in the State Department, and I aided him all I could. Finally, much worried and disgusted, he came to me and said: ‘Now, Mr. President, I have no doubt you really want me to get that place; if you do, advise me what to do.’" Said the President: "I advised him to haunt the Department, go stick it out, and force them to act."

Washington, D.C., [Friday] June 14, 1878.—I met Z. L. White, correspondent of the New York Tribune, in the outer hall of the House. He mentioned something about the Roosevelt-Prince appointment, or the New York Custom House appointments, of President Hayes, and of their defeat on confirmation. I said: "If it had been me, I should have sent them in and in until I got bottom." "Yes" he said, "but I think Mr. Hayes did right in not getting up a fight; besides I know that Mr. Hayes was persuaded against his will and judgment to send in these men in the first instance." I know that White knew.

Later in January, 1879, in the evening, while sitting in a private room (the Red room) at the White House, waiting for the President, Mr. [William T.] Crump, the President’s man, came in and began to chat. I mentioned Mr. Evarts, whom almost everybody about the house disliked, and Crump said: "Yes, if it had not been for him, the President would not have made the mistake he did in attempting to change officers in the New York Custom House. The President would not have had this trouble, but for him." I agreed. "A man with as long a political nose as Evarts has too much for one man and must stick it into somebody else’s business."

Philadelphia, Pa., Saturday, July 8th, 1878.—The Republican National Committee for the campaign of 1876 (the Hayes campaign) was organized this day [July 8] in "Parlor C" of the Continental Hotel, Philadelphia. The published list will give the names present. All were present except [John R.] McBride of Utah, [Alexander H.]Beatty of Montana, S[tephen] B. Elkins of New Mexico, and P.B.S. Pinchback of Louisiana. W[illiam] H. Kemble of Pa. was represented by R. W. Mackey. The room was stuffy and hot. There was no nomination for Chairman. We (the Blaine men) had tacitly agreed on Zach. Chandler of Michigan. Someone proposed we vote by ballot, which we did. Cornell (A[lonzo] B.) of New York, had thirteen votes, E[dward] F. Noyes of Ohio, had eleven votes, and Zach. Chandler, twenty-two votes. Chandler did not vote on this ballot. I found this out and told him to vote for himself next time. I had procured the proxy of J[ohn] R. McBride of Utah a few days before for W[illiam] P. Frye of Maine, who voted it. I had with me the proxy of Col. [Alexander H.] Beatty of Montana. Frye came to me and asked me to get another vote on our side, and we could get through. I found the vote, and on the next ballot Chandler was elected by one vote. He was as modest as a woman in the matter and was as sincere as he was able. He and William E. Chandler afterwards assured the election of President Hayes.

Before we began to ballot, Captain A. T. Wykoff, member from Ohio, arose and tendered his resignation as a member of the National Committee for the reason that he had been recently elected Chairman of the Ohio State Republican Committee, and it would require all his time. He then presented the credentials of E[dward] F. Noyes from Ohio, who had been elected by Wykoff’s Ohio State Republican Committee to the expected vacancy. He also pulled out of his pocket a proxy from Pinchback of La., a member, and remained in the room after Noyes was admitted from Ohio, to cast the Louisiana vote. Pinchback came in just as we adjourned.

Noyes was pressed for the chairmanship as the candidate’s best friend; it would not work; and we elected our own man. R[ichard] C. McCormick, Tucson, Arizona, was proposed for Secretary. William E. Chandler of New Hampshire, who could have had it unanimously, declined. McCormick tried to decline on the score of Congressional duties; that he was a member of the United States Centennial Commission of Arizona (I was a member from Idaho). I made a speech and promised to do all his work on the Centennial Commission if he would be Secretary. I was applauded, and he was unanimously elected. Judge [J. B.] Sener of Virginia, or perhaps W. E. Chandler, dropped one ballot for him as secretary in a hat for the 47 votes of the Committee.

After this business was completed, some waiting statesmen were admitted. A Negro from Georgia among the lot tried in a 20 minute speech to get what he called "material aid," vulgarly known as "greenbacks," out of the committee, in order to keep up a Republican newspaper in Georgia. It was respectfully declined as being too dangerous to pay, and no prospective returns, political or otherwise.

A man over six feet high, [George W.] Friedley by name, chairman of the Indiana Republican State [Central] Committee, next talked half an hour to impress us with the necessity of shelling out stamps liberally in his State. Greenbacks again. "That Indiana must be carried and money could do it." The usual Indiana politicians are generally called "scrubs" in the higher walks of political movements, always excepting O[liver] P. Morton. Mr. Friedley did not change the Committee’s opinion. Mr. Chandler said: "We will do all we can." The Indiana man at the organization of the National Committee, or in conventions, or when anything is to be put out or even the chance of it, usually gets a reserved seat in advance, and sits all night near the door, so as to be there first.

[James P.] Root of [Chicago,] Illinois, and [Will] Cumback of [Greensburg,] Indiana (member of the Committee), the last especially, tried to get the Committee to erect a small side show committee in Chicago, to run the party in the northwest, with full power. This was also respectfully declined, but partially accomplished by putting most of the members from all of the State of the Northwest on the Executive Committee.

[William J.] Purman, of [Tallahassee,] Florida, M.C., member of the Committee, made the "bloodiest shirt" speech I had listened to for years, claiming that unless the Government and the Committee stood up to him, he could not go home again as his Democratic friends would assassinate him. He is the Purman who turned Democrat, and declared in the House of Representatives in February, 1877, during the Hayes-Tilden contest, that Florida had gone Democratic. He had the temerity to try to keep his seat, contested in the 45th Congress, but this failed of course, as no man likes an apostate for plunder or gain. His Democratic friends promptly let him out.

Jere Haralson, M.C. (col.) of [Selma,] Alabama, [member of the National Republican Committee] said that if he and his people were not protected we could not elect anybody in Alabama. Referring to the Spencer fight with himself he said: "You [can] turn me out of the Committee if you like; I do not care who is here from Alabama, so long as he is a good Republican."

Some scores of persons having campaign song books which they wished adopted by the National Committee as the only authorized edition, were on hand and full of push. The songs were written months before the nomination and fixed so as to insert names of the candidates. They fit any man. A "Loyal League" committee was also on hand. They all wanted coin.

Marshall Jewell of [Hartford,] Conn., Postmaster General [member of the Committee], sat near me and he and George G. Gorham of [San Francisco,] California [Secretary of the Senate, and member of the Committee], went over with me to Washington that night. Mr. Jewell went out of the Cabinet on the Monday or Tuesday following.

The Committee adjourned subject to call, but it never was called in the years 1877 or 1878. The Executive Committee ran it.

Probably a hundred persons were about the door or in the hallway, button-holeing members, and asking a hearing. None wanted to put anything in the pot, however; they all wanted recognition, "material aid," or employment. The session lasted about two hours. It was my first experience and I was much amused with the celerity with which they did things. In fact, it was for organization merely, and to erect an Executive Committee with full force, and get the main or large committee out of the way. Mr. Chandler’s selection was most fortunate as he combined the highest commercial and political character, with brains; quite an unusual combination, added to his unquestioned integrity.

Washington, D.C., [Monday] August 19th, 1878.—I went out riding with President Hayes this morning. We went to the Adams express office to see a case of birds [which] I had ordered for him.

We began talking politics. He said that Mr. Blaine was on the right track—hard money and forgetting the past. I said that I feared that President Grant’s friends would wear him out prematurely as a candidate [for a third term], to which Gen’l Hayes assented. I said "Some middle man might slip in." Mr. Hayes laughed, and indicated that he had cause to know about the "slipping in of a dark horse." He said he would like to see [George Hunt] Pendleton President, if any Democrat, and thought Judge [Allen Granberry] Thurman an upright and honorable man. I spoke of Thurman’s bitterness. "Yes," Hayes said, "politically."

We were riding in an open carriage and I remarked, "What a fine looking black man for a driver." "Yes," the President said, "General Grant’s old driver [Albert Hawkins]." He remarked that he had retained eight of Grant’s old men. I replied to him, "That is the best civil service I have ever seen under you." He laughed. I then said that I thought Stuart L. Woodford, United States district attorney at Brooklyn, went to Maine to make a speech, to be martyred; wanted President Hayes to turn him out. President Hayes said: "No, I do not think so." He spoke of the general revival of times and trade. The National movement he feared but little now, but in 1876 it would have hurt us.

The President spoke very kindly of A[lfred] C. Harmer, Member of Congress from Philadelphia. He said he liked him very much, and thought him a square man.

In the afternoon Mrs. Hayes sent to my hotel with her compliments a very handsome basket of flowers for Mrs. Donaldson. It came [at an] opportune time, as it was her birthday.

Washington, D.C., [Wednesday] August 21st, 1878.—Friday I had a talk with Judge Jerry [Jeremiah M.] Wilson of Wilson and Shellabarger, counsel for John Sherman [before the Potter Investigating Committee]. I said to him that I began to believe that Sherman had written the Weber letter, and that W. S. Springer had said to me that perhaps that letter might yet be produced. Wilson did not deny that Sherman wrote the letter but said, "It will not be produced." Wilson agreed with me that if the Democrats got the next House by a big majority they might try to turn Hayes out. He said he firmly believed there was danger of it.

I went into the room of the Republican Congressional Committee of F St. [1006 F Street], just below Wilson’s office. There was no person in but the Sec’y. He said things were booming, but they were having up-hill work in getting money form office-holders and "were hindered and embarrassed in it by that man in the White House, President Hayes at one end of the Avenue, and that Dutch tramp, Sec’y Schurz, in the Interior Department, at the other."

Philadelphia, Pa., [Saturday] August 24th, 1878.—Major [E. A.] Burke, of Louisiana, said yesterday, in New York, before the Potter Committee that Senator O[liver] P. Morton was to endorse Hayes’ Southern policy.

Mr. Blaine told me March 7th or 8th [March 6], 1877, just after finishing his speech against Hayes’ Southern policy, that Senator O. P. Morton had agreed to follow him in denunciation of it.

Paris, [Wednesday] September 18th, 1878.—While riding with General J[oseph] R. Hawley, of Connecticut, to-day, we referred to Mr. Evarts. He said he [Evarts] was a dreadful failure as a politician. I mentioned that Evarts had been a bad advisor for the President, to which Hawley assented. I said to Hawley: "If you had stood out against the Packard iniquity in Louisiana, you would have been the most popular Republican in the United States." He answered, "We did not read Mr. Evarts’ instructions until we were en route, and had I read them before I started, I should have declined to go. As it was I was mad, and wanted to quit the thing then. They were outrageous. Also, another member of the Commission wanted to resign."

Washington, D.C., [Thursday] February 6, 1879.—I was with the President from eight to nine P.M. He was chatty and pleasant. He asked me about the United States judgeship at Philadelphia. He took a pencil and on a piece of paper said his candidates were in this order, viz: Brewster, (F. Carroll), [P. Pemberton] Morris, [William] Butler, [William Henry] Rawle, [William] McMichael. He said that Mr. Brewster and Mr. McMichael were the choice of politicians and the first of many lawyers but that he considered Mr. McMichael out of the question; and with this [he] drew the pencil through his name. The President mentioned the fact that a delegation of so-called respectable men from Philadelphia, blue bloods, had interviewed him and called his attention to the fact that F. Carroll Brewster was the natural son of his father, and urged this as a reason why Mr. Brewster should not be appointed. President Hayes became very angry and incensed. He said: "What has that to do with it? It was not his fault, and I admire him the more, for in spite of this, he has risen to be a distinguished man. No, sir; he is to be praised, not blamed, and it is to his credit." He at once dismissed those respectable men. He said he intended to make the appointment himself the next week, and if he could find that Mr. Brewster could be confirmed, he intended to appoint him.

Benjamin H. Brewster, afterwards Attorney-General in Arthur’s Cabinet, was a half brother of F. Carroll Brewster, and disliked him very much on account of the above fact. Turning to the subject of the post office at Philadelphia, the President said: "I have made up my mind to give General [John F.] Hartranft the post office [nominated, February 7; confirmed February 17, 1879], and send Governor [James] Pollock from the Mint where he is not a good officer, to naval officer [confirmed April 10, 1879]; and Postmaster [Archibald Louden Snowden] to the Mint."

In reply to my question as to how the arrangement would suit Pollock, the President answered that he did not care; that he had not consulted any of them, but that he intended to do it. He here called to Webb Hayes to have notices of their appointments made out for morning. They were made next day. The Star (evening paper) said, "The Cabinet to-day (7th) decided as above," etc. ["At the Cabinet meeting this afternoon were settled three of the Pennsylvania officers…], which the President had appointed the day before.

The President said, "I think that the delegation of tenderly and delicately reared Philadelphians, who came to protest against Mr. Brewster on high moral ground, were for a Mr. P. Pamberton Morris." Mr. Hayes has a very small opinion of Philadelphia nice men. Wm. Butler was appointed and only because Mr. Brewster would receive the support of certain Senators. It was feared that he might not be confirmed.

The President was called out of the room, but before going [out] told me to sit and talk with Webb. The President having gone, Webb asked me why it was that Mr. Blaine voted against the confirmation of the New York custom-house people (with Conkling) when the truth was that Mr. Blaine must have been the best pleased man in the Senate at Conkling’s defeat. Of course I answered that I knew nothing about it.

Mrs. Hayes came into the room with a letter for Webb to answer. She was pleasant and said Webb was a bad boy for not keeping up her correspondence.

Mr. T[homas] W. Price, a friend of mine, about a month ago sent Mrs. Hayes a [copy of his] small prettily published volume on Mexico [Brief Notes Taken on a trip to the City of Mexico in 1878], which she had accepted in a polite note. The note came into the hands of a son of Mr. Price’s, residing two doors from his father’s house. The son fixed up a servant in livery, placed the note on a silver salver, and sent it in to his father. For fun, of course. I told Mrs. Hayes of this, at which she laughingly said, "Now ought not the ‘old lady’ be proud?"

Samuel Hays, of St. Louis, in December last [December 4] was nominated by the President to be postmaster, vice [Chancy I.] Filley. The Senate committee on Post Roads had refused to report him for confirmation, and had authorized a sub-committee this morning to see the President and request him to withdraw his name. I informed the President of this. His answer to me was, "Mr. Hays’ commission expired on March 5; I shall commission him again the moment it expires, and I shall not withdraw his name." He so answered Senator Ferry and the sub-committee who called next day. They tried to bulldoze him. I saw the Senate committee. Mr. [Samuel J.] Kirkwood [of Iowa], among others, told them of the President’s determination, and they at once said they would confirm him. [Confirmed February 27, 1879]. The objection to Mr. Hays was that he was a Schurz Republican. Mr. Schurz is surely one of the best hated men I have known in politics.

Washington, D.C., [Friday] February 7th, 1879.—I went into a restaurant, cor. 7th and E Streets, at 3 P.M. to-day for lunch. Senator Simon B. Conover of Florida came in, in company with an Irishman [who was] slightly intoxicated, and his own son, say 6 years of age. They sat down and I paid for the refreshment which they had. The Irishman could only distinctly say "There is money in it" at the end of any sentence Conover would finish. Conover said that he had stood up to the President and now as his time was nearly out he wanted to be stood up to. He said the President thought he (Conover) had no brains, and had intimated this. Sect’y Evarts, he said, was all right and wanted to aid him. He said he would like to be Governor of Utah, to which the Irishman said, "There is money in it." Conover said he might, if out there, hit a mine or get something good, but he preferred something else. Here he wrote on a slip of paper: "Minister Resident at Central America—Guatemala, Central America, vice Williamson." He said the salary was large and he could save money. "Yes," said the Irishman, "there is money in it." "Besides," said Conover, "I will not lose my residence in Florida, of which I expect to be elected Governor two years from now." He wanted me to speak to the President.

This conversation convinced me of one of two facts, either Mr. Evarts was assigned to nurse him (Conover) to get his vote for confirmation of the New York customs appointments, which Conover voted for Feb. 3d, or else the administration had obtained him without promise.

Philadelphia, Pa., [Sunday] Feb. 9th, 1879.—I came over from Washington last night with a son of Senator J[ohn] J. Patterson of South Carolina. He was a pleasant and agreeable young man. He said that his father would not go back to South Carolina to live, and would probably go out west in the cattle business; that seven years ago Alex. McClure, of Philadelphia, Editor of the "Times," had been in South Carolina with his father and several other gentlemen, and was interested with them in a Rail Road matter; that they had made some $75,000; then something unpleasant occurred and this was why his former associates kept hammering at his father; that his father would not vote to unseat Butler (M.C.) and seat Corbin. He attributed the failure of the Republican supremacy in South Carolina to the apostasy of D. L. Chamberlain while Governor. He also said that his father was getting ready to give Pres’t. Hayes another rap in a speech; that the week before the question of the confirmation of the New York custom house appointments came up, Senator Stanley Matthews hounded his father to vote for them; that John Sherman, Sect’y of the Treasury, came to their dwelling house several times and promised his father any position, from Governor of Idaho down or up, if he would vote for the administration. His father declined and voted against them.

His father said the speech of Conkling in the Senate executive session on these appointments was the severest attack he had ever heard, and that Conkling had denounced the President and John Sherman roundly.

Washington, D.C., [Sunday] March 2, 1879.—I came up to the Capitol to-day at 11 A.M. on a street car. Standing on the rear platform was Joseph S. C. Blackburn, M.C. of Kentucky. The car conductor said "Who is going to be Speaker of the next House?" Blackburn answered, "Well, I don’t know that I should answer that; but it will be either General Garfield or myself, provided we organize the next House. It will not be Mr. Randall." The conductor said, "Are you afraid of the greenbackers?" "Oh, no; they don’t mean us any harm." The conductor said, "I don’t think there will be any greenbackers next year." "No," said Blackburn, "we will sit down on them the first chance we get." The conductor said, "Mr. Blackburn, if you had been Speaker at the time of the Electoral Commission, things would not have happened as they did." "No, sir," Blackburn replied, and pointing towards the White House, "there would have been a different set of officers there, and Hayes would not have been in office."

The conductor continued, "Randall is just as much a fraud as Hayes, and never should have been Speaker." Blackburn said, "If Randall had kept his work at the time of the Electoral count, Hayes would not have been President. On Tuesday, before the Friday of the final action, eighteen of us met Randall in the afternoon in a private room under the House, and he agreed with us that we should have the advantage of the rules, and should be permitted to filibuster beyond the 4th of March, so as to put Tilden in, and agreed to hold out to the end of Congress. This was a solemn agreement. On Thursday after noon at five o’clock he went back on us and on his pledges, by voting against us. If he had kept his word, Mr. Tilden would have been President. Of course, there would have been a little revolution in that building (pointing to the Capitol) for a few hours; but I have such an abiding faith in the good sense of the people, that they would have hailed the result (Tilden) with shouts and asserted their rights."

We left the car. I walked into the Capitol and to Mr. Randall’s room, wrote the above out and handed it to him to read. He replied sharply that it was an entire falsehood in every word that related to him.

Sitting at breakfast [with me] this morning, Judge Jonathan Tarbell, asst. 2d comptroller [Deputy First Comptroller’s Office], told me of an acquaintance who was a friend of the Hon. Hannibal Hamlin. The friend went to Senator Hamiln about a month ago with a petition for an office. Hamlin, after reading the heading, refused to sign it. The gentleman asked him why. "Because," said Senator Hamlin, pointing his finger to the name of President Hayes to whom it was addressed, "because it is addressed to a damned traitor."

I sat this evening, say 10 P.M., in the marble room of the Senate with Senators [Blanche K.] Bruce of Miss. and [John J.] Patterson of South Carolina. The conversation turning on President Hayes, [Senator] Patterson said: "In February 1877, after Senator John Sherman came back from Ohio where he had been at the request of Hayes, he came over to me in the Senate and said: ‘How long can Chamberlain hold out in South Carolina?’ I said, ‘Forever.’ He replied, ‘Hayes intends to sustain him; so let him hold on.’ When Gov. Hayes came to Washington in March, the 2nd I believe, he came into this room the morning after he arrived. He called me [to] one side and said, ‘I want you to come and see me; I want to talk about Chamberlain. I now intend to sustain him.’ On the next day I went to John Sherman’s house and met Gov. Hayes. He drew aside near one of the windows, and said to me ‘I understand the South Carolina case thoroughly and intend to sustain Chamberlain as Governor. The Louisiana case is different. I intend to send a commission of strong Republicans to Louisiana who will make a report sustaining Packard, and then I shall sustain him.’ I said, ‘May I telegraph Chamberlain that you intend to sustain him?’ He replied, ‘Yes,’ and then I telegraphed Chamberlain.

"At this interview he asked me my opinion of putting into his Cabinet a conservative Democrat from the South, and gave the name of John Hancock of Texas and D. M. Key of Tennessee. I objected, saying they were both men recently rejected by their constituents and with no influence. I then recommended Gen’l Joe Johnston or Gen’l Wade Hampton, if he must have a rebel. He said, ‘They are too radical.’ I said, ‘If you get Key or Hancock you will get men whom you will influence, control, and give opinions to. If you get Hampton or Johnston, you will get men who will have their own opinions and who have influence in the South.’ I asked him how he expected the people of the North to take this and whether he was ready to stand the odium of such an act. He said he had considered the cost and was prepared to meet it.

"About two weeks after this, when he showed signs of going back on us, I went to John Sherman and asked him what was the matter. He said, ‘See Hayes. Evarts is all wrong, and things are not going as you were promised.’ I then went to Pres’t. Hayes and asked him if he did not intend to keep his word as to Chamberlain. He answered, ‘I am forced to change my plans.’ I said, ‘Did you not tell me to telegraph Chamberlain that you intended to sustain him?’ ‘Yes, I did; but events have changed my intentions.’ I left him in anger. I saw Mr. Evarts, and found him loud in the same way. Don Cameron told me that about the 3d of March, 1877, Gov. Hayes sent for him and said to him, ‘Mr. Cameron, I intend to send you to Louisiana at the head of a commission to make a report sustaining Packard.’ Cameron said he would accept and went to his home at Harrisburg where he expected to receive his appointment; but never after heard a word about it again."

A messenger of the Senate called to get both Senators in to vote; so we parted.

Washington, D.C., [Monday] March 10, 1879.—The education of a statesman is not the work of a moment, no more than the elevation of Dempsy Maguire to the common council makes him an Honorable, although Hon. is prefixed to his name.

Statesmanship is an education in knowledge of men and things, along with what we call reserve force—that is, common sense to most emergencies coolly and to suggest prompt remedies. In our popular form of Government, unfit men are apt to ride into important places on the tide of sudden political changes. The future battle in American politics is to keep unworthy and unfit men out of position. Able, competent, and experienced men will assert themselves by merit and come to the front and not depend on self assertion and egotism.

The incoming Administration of President Hayes foisted upon the country, as leaders, a coterie of unknown men. Suddenly several brilliant political meteors appeared, to the astonishment of the experienced. Mr. Wm. Evarts, of New York, first in importance, is a gentleman of legal experience, but whose political services consisted of a short term in the Cabinet of President [Andrew] Johnson as Attorney General. As President Johnson’s Attorney General he aided and abetted some of the most violent and injurious of Mr. Johnson’s actions, and retired from that post with the unanimous consent and approval of the whole country. He became President Hayes’ Secretary of State. Support of his retirement from Mr. Johnson’s Cabinet had become, if possible, more unanimous. The whole country, convinced of his thorough unfitness, longs for the announcement of his early and complete departure from American politics, which will be when President Hayes retires, unless he should catch on to Congress.

Mr. William Evarts, a most estimable citizen in private life, is a startling example of the amateur politician which the first hundred years of American Government has afforded. Such a mistake as the placement of such a thoroughly inexperienced person in high political position will not be attempted soon again. It is unfortunate for Mr. Evarts that he should be the pivotal point for the turn in employment of inexperienced persons in politics, as a frightful example for the present and future guidance of the people.

Washington, D.C., [Saturday] March 29, 1879.—I was at the White House with the President at 10 P.M. to-night. Webb Hayes was with us. Major [William] McKinley, M.C. from Ohio came in unannounced. He said to the President, "I want you to appoint a man for me Secretary of Utah." The President said, "How did you know there was a vacancy?" "Oh," said McKinley, "I heard it at 5 P.M. and only came in the city at 4 P.M." The President laughed and said: "Well, Major, I have already filled the vacancy."

McKinley then said, "Garfield made a good speech to-day [on the Army Appropriations Bill]. It was full of which his speeches generally lack, i.e., fire, earnestness and courage. Yet, when he was through he came around amongst us and said he was afraid he had been too radical. He was afraid that he had offended someone. Our fellows all said bosh; that was all there was in it."

I knew Garfield intimately. He had physical but no moral courage while on his feet in Congress. He was a good soul and deserved great credit for his energy and acquirements. Coming up from the ranks, anything was possible for him and to him, if he had had moral courage on the floor. I was always on the most friendly terms with and very fond of him. In 1872 Gov. [William] Dennison of Ohio told me that Garfield had consulted him with reference to a residence on the Pacific Coast (San Francisco). He (Garfield) had been offered a most lucrative law position, attorney for the Pacific Mail Steam Ship Company, I think [at] $10,000 per year. Gov. D[ennison] advised him to take it, but he declined. This was during the Credit Mobilier investigation. General Garfield was much cut [up] at the newspaper stabs at his character, and published a pamphlet in his own defense in 1872 and 1873, which of course scarcely any one read, because every person who knew him knew he was an honest man.

In 1874 or 1875, Otto R[obards] Singleton of Mississippi, and [Robert Milton] Speer of Pennsylvania made some allusion to him on the floor of the House, which Garfield did not resent. Mr. Randall complained to me that Garfield did not answer back. In 1876, I think in April or May during a night session, S. S. Cox of New York was in the Chair (Committee of the Whole) when Garfield rose up to vouch for a statement made by a fellow-member. Cox smilingly said, "And who will vouch for the member from Ohio." Garfield, aroused, sprang to his feet and demanded that the Committee rise, so that the words of Mr. Cox could be taken down. His action, tone and language brought the whole House to its feet and a scene of great excitement ensued. Mr. Cox apologized.

Next morning I was standing with a dozen others in the rear lobby of the House near a door looking into the hall when I was greeted with "Tom, old boy, how are you?" by Garfield, who said: "Didn’t I fix him (meaning Cox) last night?" "Yes," I answered; "Garfield, that scene did me good. Go on and do it more; assert your character and then people won’t say ‘Garfield has no courage.’" He laughed and went into the House.

In the debate from March 29, 1879 to April 5, 1879, on the Army [Appropriations] Bill, after his great speech of March 29, Garfield showed a disposition to weaken on his radicalism, or rather to take back his radical utterances, notably on the 4th of April when pushed by J. S. C. Blackburn of Kentucky. Many good speeches were made by Hawley and others. Passing through the hall beneath the House on my way out of the building, I met W. P. Frye of Maine, and said, "Well, Joe Hawley made a great speech [April 4]." "Yes," said he, "Joseph is fast becoming a stalwart." I spoke of Garfield’s itching to go back on what he [had] said. "Yes," said Frye, "he always does when he can."

I knew Garfield from my boyhood. I knew him as a college teacher, as a State Senator, made out his appointment (I think) as Major [Lieutenant Colonel] of the 42nd Ohio in 1861; saw him the day he arrived in the Army of the Ohio, Sunday the 5th of April, 1862, near Savannah; then as a Brig. General in command of a Brigade in [Thomas J.] Wood’s division, and sat on a log and talked with him for half an hour before we [my regiment] moved up to go into action at Shiloh. Met him often at his room or tent as Major General, Chief of Staff to [General William S.] Rosecrans, Army of the Cumberland; and knew him intimately as a Member of Congress from and after 1863.

Garfield was an honorable man, a good friend and a patriot. He was vain and egotistical at times, and sometimes a little pompous, but was a good man and one of the most useful men ever in the lower House, but not a very popular one. He was about 6 feet high with an enormous head, high forehead and long oval face, with full sandy whiskers and sandy hair. He was the inventor of the manner of wearing a soft high-crowned hat, a popular one in the war amongst the military men; by breaking it in the top center of the crown so as to make all above the rim wedge shaped. His head was so large that a hat, round all the way up to the crown, gave the impression of hat walking away with a man. In 1861 while a major he innaugerated [sic] this hat fashion.

Garfield was entitled to the Ohio Senatorship in 1877, vice [John] Sherman, but was talked and promised out of it. He was one of the best stump speakers in the country, having abundance of vigor, force and power. He was at times really very eloquent and was always clear, forcible, and logical. Prepared, he was one of the ablest speakers ever in Congress. On the stump it was amusing to hear him talk about "his right hand being palsied," at the same time making his gestures with his left. He was a left handed man.

Washington, D.C., [Friday] April 4, 1879.—I was at the White House this day from 12 to 2:30 on the President’s private business. While standing in the long hall upstairs at the west end of the building, second story, Mrs. Hayes, who had been out calling or shopping, came in, retired to her room, and after throwing off her wraps came to where I was, for a chat. She sat down in a large arm chair. Rutherford, her son (about eighteen) from Cornell, at once sat down on one arm of it and placed his arms about his mother. Scott, the little boy, age seven, and Fanny, in an instant were petting her. Finally Webb, said, "Let’s go to lunch." Mrs. Hayes came to me and said, "Come, you don’t know what a good cup of tea you will miss." I declined. She insisted, saying "Come along, we won’t wait for Mr. Hayes." (It was Cabinet day, and 2:30 P.M.).

Just then the President came out of the library. At once the two smaller children started to catch him; one was in his arms and the other by the hands. Rud struck a position and said, "He comes." The President urged me to come down first with the two smaller children. Miss [Mary E.] McDowell of Chicago, a guest, was with Rud, and Mrs. Hayes was on the arm of Webb who began to whistle. As they passed down [the stairs] Mrs. Hayes said to me, "See this boy;" and he, with his finger pointing, "See this girl." Mrs. Hayes then said, "What do you think of this boy?" "Well," I said (Webb was patting her cheek), "I know some men that would not object to being in his place just now."

All of the Hayes boys were their father’s friends and their mother’s big brothers. As they went down the stairs out of sight, I said to [William T.] Crump, the President’s steward, "I believe that the happiest family ever in this house" (as President). Crump replied, "I was just going to say that myself." Rud Hayes, a student at Cornell, said to me while riding with me to-day that, although he had been at Cornell for years, he had never seen Andrew D. White, the President, but once and then not until Gen. J. A. Garfield’s speech at Ithaca last fall (1878) when White was introduced to him. As White had just been made Minister to Berlin, Germany, by President Hayes [nominated March 26; confirmed April 2, 1879], it had been alleged by political papers that the place was given White on account of favors to Rud at Cornell. This was interesting.

Prior to lunch, Webb Hayes was rearranging a case of curious things given to his father, and putting new labels on them. He had a pair of slippers, once the property of Abraham Lincoln, and a cane of George Washington’s. The President was very fond of curious things. Webb handed me a piece of the coat Mr. Lincoln was wearing when murdered. Mrs. Lincoln gave the coat to one of the doorkeepers, Mr. Penndel [Pendel], still in the house.

New York City [Tuesday] April 15, 1879.—I was sitting with Gov. Benj. F. Potts of Montana in the Fifth Avenue Hotel when W[illiam] E. Chandler of New Hampshire came in. I introduced him to Potts, also to Col. T[homas] W. Knox, the Siberian traveler, and he sat down for a chat. I had served on the National Republican Committee in 1876 with Chandler and liked him very much, and the liking continues to this hour. He was by far the best and most positive Republican on the Committee, and one of the most powerful men in political management the country ever produced. It was he that took Gen’l Hayes into the Presidency and carried Florida by personally standing back of the Canvassing Board and making them do their duty. His sentiments on the Southern question the country knows.

I began by objecting to Mr. Blaine’s anti-Chinese speech. Chandler said, "Well, suppose he did make it. I don’t care much for men in public life who are holding back from positive declaration because of fear what effect speech will have on their chance of being President." He sustained Blaine’s view of the proposition that we had enough to ameliorate and condone in negroes, etc. "It’s all right," he said. "I am not in favor of Grant in 1880. I like Blaine and some things in Conkling (who is a big boy) I like better than qualities in Blaine. I am for either of them before Grant. If the state of New Hampshire will send me as a delegate to the convention, I shall go and vote against Grant."

Chandler said one of the principal causes of his bitterness against Hayes’ policy was that Hayes and those immediately about him, Matthews, Evarts, Dennison and all were constantly lying to people about what Hayes intended to do. In February, 1877, prior to Hayes being inaugurated, he went to Dennison and told him that it was with difficulty that [Senator George E.] Spencer and other Republican Senators could be prevailed upon to let the count for Hayes proceed to a conclusion; that they were afraid of Hayes from rumor and statements from outside parties—afraid of bargains with the South. Dennison said, "Let me see them and talk to them; I will fix them!" Chandler said that Dennison wanted to get to them so he could fix them as usual. He (Chandler) was at the White House on Friday morning, March 2, 1877, feeling uneasy, unsettled and anxious about what Hayes was going to do. He met Wm Pitt Kellogg (Ex-Governor of La.) on the step. While they stood there on the porch chatting a carriage drove up and out stepped General [Senator] Sherman, Governor Dennison and Governor Hayes. They remained in the White House about half an hour and then came out, Dennison in the lead. Dennison scarcely noticed Chandler and Kellogg; in fact, did not speak, but tried to get Hayes and Sherman into the carriage without speaking to either. This was on the porch. Chandler walked up to Hayes and said, "How do you do, Gov. Hayes? This is Gov. Kellogg, of Louisiana." Hayes was cordial and pleasant.

After they left, Chandler went into the White House to Grant’s room and found that Grant had, at the request of Hayes and the two advisers (Dennison and Senator Sherman, above mentioned) issued the non-interference order to Augur (General in La.) and had felt so mean at having to revoke his policy and abandon his Republicanism that he did not sign it, but had [C. C.] Sniffin, his Assistant Private Secretary, sign it. Chandler said that Dennison was a nice gentlemanly man but with no ability. The effect of Hayes’ desertion of the Republicans South was to at once bankrupt and drive from the South all Republicans of power and ability. Had Hayes, after his election, given them notice of his intentions to desert them, they would have had time between then and the 4th of March, 1877, to have sold their property and gotten away. As it was, they were forced to leave without their property and most of them left without a cent.

In my opinion W[illiam] E. Chandler did more to place Hayes in the Presidency than any other or all other persons. His courage, indomitable will, resources and ability were all used in the management of the Electoral Commission, in holding the Republicans up to the rack; and before this, in the Republican National Committee (of which I was a member and could see his ability).

Chandler referred to Ex-Gov. R[ichard] C. McCormick who had been Secretary of our National Republican Committee with office in the Hotel in which we were sitting, a post which Chandler declined after long series of years of service, urging it upon McCormick. Chandler said he admired him very much, and his relations were cordial with him, but that McCormick had no political courage or backbone and was a man he did not want to have about in a fight. In fact, McCormick was mortally afraid of hurting his political opponents. Chandler, after the State elections of October 1876, saw that the drift was toward the Democrats, so he hurried to New York, saw Mr. Zach. Chandler, chairman of our Committee, and urged that he issue circulars and addresses against Mr. Tilden’s war claim record; in fact, blustering circulars for effect. Mr. W. E. Chandler wrote them and presented them to McCormick, secretary of the Committee, who refused to sign them because they were directed against Mr. Tilden. "Then," said Mr. Chandler, "I found that McCormick thought that Tilden was going to be elected, and he (McCormick) probably wanted to be in shape for consideration hereafter." At his (McCormick’s) suggestion Chandler cut out and changed some expressions. We showed the emendations and alterations to Zach. Chandler, Chairman, who said, "What’s the use of altering the thing? Don’t you see that McCormick don’t intend to sign it?" So the circular went to the public signed by old Zach. only.

Chandler’s idea of McCormick was like my own, that McCormick had no business capacity. "Yet," said he, "McCormick will always have a place, because he is pleasant and sweet to everyone; has no opinions and gives no offense. When I was a boy twelve years of age working in the post office at Concord, N.H., old Jackson (or Johnson) Post Master, used to say that the way to win in politics was to be soft and smooth, and to rub no hair backwards." Chandler added, "Yes, your aggressive, hard hitting, positive men come to but little in public life. It’s your soft, double-faced fellows that win!"

He said that he believed that the President and every one of his Cabinet, except always Evarts, were honestly desirous of a Republican victory next year; that Evarts desired the defeat of the Republican party if it did not work for his personal advancement and aims. That he was politically treacherous and unfit for his place; that Hayes had met him (Evarts) in Philadelphia, July 4, 1876, and had asked him to make a [campaign] speech for him in New York, promising to put him in his Cabinet for so doing. Evarts was vain enough to claim that his speech would carry New York for Hayes.

Mr. Chandler denounced in most emphatic and positive terms the surrender of Louisiana and South Carolina by President Hayes to the ex-Rebels. He stated that 20 days after Hayes was President, Packard, as Louisiana Governor, transmitted to President Hayes, as provided by the Constitution, the resolution of the Legislature of Louisiana calling on the President for aid to suppress domestic revolution; all of which was legal and constitutional, and that Hayes had never been the man to acknowledge them to Packard. He called attention to the fact that at some time in all men’s political lives they became soft, weak, mean or cowardly. He cited Greeley, Raymond, Hayes, Garfield, etc.; that the Republicans had at time felt this.

Chandler then spoke of W. P. Frye, Member of Congress of Maine (of whom I said, "He was the best of men"), as a brave able man, but lazy; that he was such a constant smoker and dreamer that he did not try to be a leader; that he (Chandler) had stormed so at Frye for smoking and dreaming that Frye got angry every time Chandler mentioned smoking. He said it was laughable and ridiculous to hear men who had been soldiers on the Union side, and brave good ones too, get up and apologize for their acts in putting down rebellion and shipping traitors; that they had no right to do this; they only had a right to speak for themselves. It was assumption and presumption, he said, for such men to attempt to speak for Union men of the war; that while he himself did not do service in the field, he did attempt to sustain the Union and aid the soldiers as much as possible, and that no man had a right to say for him or for those like him that they had surrendered or given up their love for the Union and Union loyalty.

I admire Mr. Chandler greatly because I knew his worth. He is the best fighter in the Republican party but he is always a little more radical than his party in the measures he proposes. He leads the fight and backs the true along untravelled paths. Men of timid natures get afraid of him, but the best thing of all about Mr. Chandler is that he never gets afraid of himself. He knows he is right, or believes he is, and then fights. (Not corrected. TCD).

Washington, D.C., [Thursday] May 1, 1879.—I was with President Hayes from 8 to 10 P.M. He was very pleasant and agreeable. I told him of the general [public] opinion of Mr. Evarts—that he was a possible humbug—and of the opinion of W. E. Chandler’s that Evarts did not desire a Republican victory or any other that did not work to his personal advantage. I had just left Gen’l J[oseph] R. Hawley who had mentioned some of the public opinions of Evarts’; and on the 2" of May Hawley told me that Murat Halstead [of the Cincinnati Commerical] had the same opinion of Evarts, and that George Jones, publisher of the New York Times, had most thorough political disgust for Evarts. That Sir Edward Thornton, British Minister, had said within a day or two that he had called scores of times upon Mr. Evarts, within the past six months, for answers to some urgent matter and had been turned away from the State Department. That a Secretary of one of the Legations had said complaints among the foreign legations were universal for slowness, delay and incapacity; and that Evarts was laughed at by all diplomats. I urged the President to consider that Evarts was a most unfit man and he ought to unload him. The President seemed very serious and kept quiet for a long time without speaking.

J. R. Hawley had told me this evening that J[ames] R[onald] Chalmers, M.C. of Mississippi (Dem.) known as war murderer and an alleged cold blooded and atrocious cutthroat who murdered in spite of prayers and pleadings about 150 prisoners of war (surrendered men) at Fort Pillow, Tenn., in 1864, made an effort to raise a committee in the House to investigate as to whether the Report of the Senate Committee in 1869 made by Ben Wade to this effect was true or not. In fact, he offered a Resolution in the House to raise a committee to investigate and exonerate himself (this in the last of April, 1879).

Gen’l J. A. Garfield, M.C. of Ohio (Rep.) got the floor after Chalmers, and most forcibly and plausibly talked Chalmers into consenting that the Resolution be laid aside. Chalmers the next day or so wrote a speech to be delivered on his resolution when he should again call it up. He submitted it to Garfield who showed it to the other leading Republicans who advised Garfield to let Chalmers alone and to not become sponsor for his speech. Garfield told Hawley that [Julius Caesar] Burroughs, M.C. of Michigan (Rep.) had found among the Rebel Archives in the War Department an official report of the battle made by N. B. Forrest, Rebel General in command at the battle (to whom Chalmers was second) to the Rebel War Department in which was the sentence "The slaughter was so great that for two hundred yards the river was red with blood." On the back of the report was an endorsement by Jeff Davis; and when Chalmers took the floor again, he, Burroughs, would read this report, Garfield said.

I repeated this to President Hayes who said, "I have heard of this before; you tell Hawley to be careful, for on hearing this story I sent to the War Department and found that the report in question was there but not so strong as stated. The endorsement was signed simply with the initials "J.D." and although in his handwriting was only a reference (official).

The President said that in the winter of 1866 he and Ben Wade (Senator) and their wives were in Memphis, Tenn., for pleasure when they met a former friend of the President’s named Wilkerson[?] from Cincinnati, Ohio who had served on the staff of R[alph] P. Buckland (Brig. Gen’l from Ohio) during the war. He told Hayes that he would like to have him meet Forrest (N.B.) who had commanded the Rebels at Fort Pillow, so Hayes and Ben Wade (who had made the report against Forrest) met him. President Hayes said he was frank, positive and manly in conversation and talked over his part in the war. Forrest said he was in favor of Negro suffrage, and wanted the Negroes to have their civil rights (yet he was the grand cyclops of the Ku Klux in his State afterward—an order organized to regulate murder and destroy Negroes.)

I notice that all leading Southern men are very fair and sweet in personal speech and assertion, yet history furnished no parallels to the horror and punishments through which our soldiers passed while prisoners during the war. Many of them were Jesuits in manner and thugs in practice; listen to them and there never was an injustice to a Negro or injury during the time of the reign of divine slavery. The South, according to its apostles, is a land of flowers and love. They are, and were, the most magnificent people in defense of their methods and institutions that history records.

Forrest turned to Senator Wade and began to review the Fort Pillow affair, to give his version of it. He said he was not there at the beginning of the battle but arrived before the final charge. There were three things which made his men charge desperately and fight fiercely: 1st On the morning’s march to the Fort they found two wagons loaded with whisky, so many of them were drunk; 2nd It was the first time his men had encountered Negro troops; and 3rd The white troops in the Union fort were native Tennesseans, and between the Unionist and rebel of Tennessee there was undying hate. Forrest claimed that the slaughter followed the assault over earth-works, due to the hot blood of his men; and that the works were carried and the whole thing ended in 20 minutes. The garrison attempting to escape to the river were killed in the water and on the river bank. He said he did not desire to shrink responsibility but denied that there was any massacre. Hawley said, as I told him this, "Was there ever a massacre?" True.

President Hayes said that Ben Wade and himself were both impressed with the manner of the man, and even Wade was inclined to believe his story. Hayes believed it. The President, being one of the most impulsive men under a calm exterior with a heart full of kindness, would be impressed by just such a cool, calculating man as Forrest whose experience of men in his slave trading and sporting in early life would show him the impressibility of Hayes. This impulsiveness has been the President’s misfortune while President. He has been imposed upon by political frauds and liars.

N. B. Forrest came to Washington in 1871 or 1872, and demanded pay from the Government for some mules taken by our forces during the War. He talked with Hawley, then as now an M.C., and thought he could get his pay. He did not; his loyalty was questioned. Ten years after the War Forrest was buried in his Rebel uniform.

J. R. Chalmers was Forrest’s second in command during the Fort Pillow massacre and did some of the killing himself. (See testimony in report of Committee on Conduct of the War.) He was desirous at this time, April 1879, to raise a committee to investigate his case so he could bring in his comrades in arms (who had been branded by the world as murderers) as witnesses to vindicate him, and thus vindicate themselves. Such things should not be permitted.

I asked the President for the truth of the statement made at this time, and since asserted in Dick Taylor’s (Gen’l Rich’d Taylor, son of President [Zachary] Taylor) book just out [Destruction and Reconstruction: Personal Experiences of the Late War], that he [Hayes] was sworn in on the 4" of March 1877, Sunday, as President, in private. The President said he was publicly sworn in on Monday, March 5, 1877. I asked him if he had seen Taylor’s book and if he had ever met him. Taylor was famous as a society man and for after dinner talks. In March 1879 I was invited to dine at a friend’s where there were to be Robert G. Ingersoll, Richard Taylor and Clarence King, all famous talkers. (I met King only; the others were detained and did not arrive in time.) The President said he had met Taylor several times on the Peabody Educational Board and had heard him talk. [Hayes’ diary, October 5, 1878: "General Dick Taylor is a witty talker, polite and liberal."]. Taylor had boasted at the close of the war that he had killed more Union soldiers than any General in the Rebel Army. This is on the authority of Samuel Shellabarger, M.C., who told me this. The President thought Taylor’s book was passionate, bitter, vindictive, abusing everybody and almost everything mentioned, and would do no good.

The President then said that President Grant had given him (Hayes) and party a dinner on Saturday, March 3", 1877. Grant had called him after dinner into the Red Parlor and asked his son (Grant’s) to "go get a pen and ink." Judge Waite, Chief Justice, one of the guests, came into the room with a paper in his hand, which was an oath of office prepared by him. Young Grant returned with the pen and ink, Hayes signed the oath, and was thus made President of the United States. Of course he was publicly sworn in on the Monday following, March 5".

I asked the President who proposed the swearing in on Saturday. He said it was done "by agreement amongst us," but I got the impression that it was done by Grant. He was uncertain as to the day of the agreement and promised me to look it up and write it out for me.

This swearing in on Saturday does not look as though he had much faith in his new Southern allies.

I believe it is almost conclusive that he had no bargain; if so, he had no faith in the promises of the Southern leaders.

My judgment was and is that Hayes was surrounded by a coterie of weak men politically, self seekers and half Republicans—men suddenly elevated into leadership, advisorship and prominence by reason of knowing Hayes personally—such men as Matthews, Foster (C.), Dennison and Evarts, all who had totally disappeared from politics with exception of the last. None of these men were able to cope with Lamar, Gordon, John Young Brown, D. John Ellis and Major [E. A.] Burke and Rebels who were full of honeyed words and sweet peaches, who lured these weak men into their trap. They had them go to Hayes and urge upon him the surrender and disregard of Republicans in the South. In fact, Mr. Matthews, C. Foster, William Dennison, Jr., and William M. Evarts became the messengers of these able Southern men who had all to gain without political conscience or fear. The fertility of Southern expression and their power of imagination was used with golden speech upon these poor fellows for a change of policy in Southern affairs. Greater men than Hayes, surrounded as he was by these men, would have been deceived. The manner in which the Northern people sat down upon all of these brevet Southerners or Southern aspirants was amusing. They passed away amid a howl of indignation. The true aim of Lamar, Gordon, Brown and the rest was to get control of the several Southern States. They did not care for Tilden; they wanted the Republicans of the South crushed, the army withdrawn, and they to have control.

Washington, D.C., [Tuesday-Friday] May 6-9, 1879.—When I arrived in Washington this [Tuesday] P.M. and called on Gen’l [Joseph R.] Hawley, he told me that on Monday some of the Republican members of the House, [William] McKinley of Ohio, [William P.] Frye and [Thomas B.] Reed of Maine, [George M.] Robeson of New Jersey, [George D.] Robinson of Massachusetts, and himself, by appointment made by McKinley at 3 P.M. of this day, had been in consultation with the President for one and a half hours on his veto of the pending Army Bill [to prohibit military interference in elections, H.R. No. 1382]. Frye, Reed and himself urged the President to refuse assent. Robinson, Robeson and McKinley were undecided but seemed to lean toward to the President’s view, which was that it didn’t amount to anything; and the President gave them notice that he intended to approve it. Hawley told them that he would never vote for the bill under any circumstances, and that he considered it worse than any bill of the kind offered as it contained a sweeping repeal of all existing laws. The President intimated that he had been led to believe that many Republicans would vote for it. Hawley, Reed and Frye persistently urged him not to sign it. As they left, the President intimated that he was sorry but that he felt as though he must sign, and hoped that there would be no row between the party and himself. Just after this the bill was voted on in the House and every Republican present vote "No." [See Congressional Record, House of Representatives, May 6, 1879, for the vote].

On Tuesday [May 6] (this day) the New York World had an account of this interview to which I called the President’s attention.

On Tuesday and Wednesday our folks [Republicans] were very blue. Hawley went over to Hoar and Edmunds in the Senate who advised him that he was right, and of their intention to resist the bill at all events. On Wednesday [May 7] it was thought best that I should go up and see the President in a quiet way, so at 8 P.M. I called. The President came in from the Library and was pleasant and cordial. I remained until 10 P.M.

The President mentioned to me that his wounds troubled him a great deal in hot weather. He was shot through the left arm and the right knee. His left ankle was badly wrenched by his horse being shot while riding him at full speed, and falling upon him. This pained him greatly. I jokingly spoke of his youthful appearance and he laughed and said, "I am 57 years old."

Hayes was always young to me. His fresh, genial voice and laughing face which seemed to light up with a warm glow as his years increased. He had a very cheerful voice and his grey eyes [bluish grey] would show a square, honest soul. His manner of talking in private was earnest and positive. His positive manner rather prevented persons from differing with him, although they had come there for that purpose; so he, in many cases, lost the benefit of opposition and did not hear the reasoning which would have been of service to him. In general, men of affairs who desire to retain influence with officials, form the President down, never oppose for policy. On the contrary, they acquiesce through fear of exciting displeasure. Congressmen are more prone than others. They drift with the tide or rather tie to power. This prevailing weakness is a cause of much evil in government.

I began discussion on the pending army bill by saying to the President that I had had a talk with Hawley, [George B.] Loring, [James] Monroe and others, all M.C.s, and they were of opinion from what was said that "you would approve the army bill." They were very sorry, as it would produce disorder in the party and cause bad feelings again; that he, Hayes, would again go to the rear in the estimation of Republicans. I urged upon him the fact that the Republicans in the House had voted solidly against the bill, and that there would be a desperate fight in the Senate. I urged that this was the worst bill, because of its sweeping repeal, ever brought to him. I repeated that information had been given the papers of his interview with the informal committee on Monday, and the despondency which followed it.

The President replied by saying that expected to be governed upon political questions by the action of his party and to stand with it. He would veto [May 29, 1879] the Legislative, Judicial and Executive bill ["An Act Making Appropriations for the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Expenses of the Government"], with its 6th Section ["An Act Making Appropriations for Certain Judicial Expenses"] in a separate veto [June 23, 1879], and this Section he might have approved as he would the proposition of Mr. Robeson from the Republican Caucus Committee. (The Committee consisted of Messrs. Edumnds, Frye, and Robeson, the latter elected on motion of Mr. J. R. Hawley). This proposition offered by Mr. Robeson ["A Bill to Further Protect the Freedom of Elections"] had been voted down by the Democrats on Tuesday afternoon.

Now it was a horse of another color. The declaratory preamble of this pending bill (no part of the law) ["Whereas the presence of troops at the polls is contrary to the spirit of our institutions and the traditions of our people and tends to destroy the freedom of elections"], was all clap trap. We all assented to it but the cry of "Bloody Shirt," "Solid South," "Army at the Polls," were all political battle cries, with nothing much in them. But they were powerful in electioneering.

The President said he had examined carefully into the history of the enactment of the Act of 1865. The Republicans at that time with a two-thirds majority knew what they wanted, and that the whole drive and intention of that act was to protect state elections. The 14th and 15th amendments were not adopted at that time, so the legislation of that year had no bearing on them or the condition of affairs after they passed (the last in 1870), he said.

"Now it is time to call a halt." Striking his hand on the table, the President continued, "this thing of States Rights has gone far enough. What a preposterous idea that the United States cannot enforce its own laws, can’t protect its own citizens in their rights; or control for good in the interest of peace or in the election of its own officers. The Democrats insist that the polls, places sacred to peace and quiet, shall be the only places in the country where crime is to be permitted and the laws are not to be enforced."

After a full and frank talk he led me to understand that he would veto the bill. He spoke of the speeches on the former bill, naming Garfield’s first, Robeson’s next and then Hawley’s. He said Robeson’s was a powerful legal argument. His theory of the functions of the government is the "Websterian;" he follows Webster and it is the correct one.

I told the President that the Democrats would be infuriated at his veto as they had been given to understand by a person close to him that he would sign. Of course I meant Mr. Evarts whom Mr. Blaine intimated to me four weeks ago was making promises and trying to sell out Hayes. The President looked serious at this.

In the morning I saw Mr. Blaine at once and told him to whoop up the Senate and for Edmunds, Chandler, and the rest to jump the bill furiously. He did this. I saw Hawley and astonished him by telling him that Hayes would veto the Army bill. Robeson went to the White House and retracted some of his opinions of Monday, and asked Hayes to veto, saying to me at 2, after his return, "I laid aside my law for the sake of the party."

Dr. Geo. B. Loring, M.C. of Mass., went to the White House on Friday morning [May 9] with a copy of the "Boston Adviser" and said to the President, "Mr. President, here is a decent, respectable newspaper of Boston; read its editorial on your duty as to this Army bill. I don’t want to bore you by reading it, but it demands your veto." "Doctor," said the President, "You don’t need to read it; my mind is made up that way."

I urged our friends to keep quiet until the bill passed the Senate for fear the Democrats would amend it so that the President’s objections would be overcome.

I saw Mr. Speaker [Samuel J.] Randall at 4 P.M. of Friday while the bill was towards its passage in the Senate, and told him the President would veto it. He seemed surprised and said: "Well, then, we will have to give him more bills to veto. We will probably remain here all summer." Garfield met me and said: "Will the President approve this bill?" I said, "No, sir, he will not." Garfield laughed, and said "Good."

I was walking with General J. R. Hawley in the lobby of the House and met Murat Halstead, Editor of [the] Cincinnati Commercial. Hawley and I drew to one side to let Halstead pass. Halstead had been pumping Hawley for an interview for the Commercial. Hawley told me that Halstead, who had been in Clubs and Societies with President Hayes for twenty odd years, looked upon Hayes as a man of great design; that underneath his indifference to public honors was a deep, aspiring ambition; and that all his political positions had resulted from constant care of public opinion, with an eye to the main chance. He thought Hayes more able than he had credit for being. Halstead was a fair judge of men and was very intimate with Hayes. Hayes had a very good opinion of Halstead. I frequently saw Halstead at the White House at odd times.

I started home at 5:30 P.M. and traveled to Philadelphia with General W[illiam] G. LeDuc, Commissioner of Agriculture. He was a former partner of W[illiam] K. Rogers, Hayes’ Private Secretary, in business at Minneapolis, Minn. LeDuc said Evarts was a scheming politician and should go out of the Cabinet, and that Schurz was a time server. He wondered how Evarts ever got in Hayes’ Cabinet, also Devens.

At home, on Sunday, May 11, ’79, I wrote the following letter to the President, the sentence "Sanctuaries for crime" being mine, and sent it to him:

132 N. 40th St., Philadelphia, Pa.

May 11, 1879

My dear Mr. President:

One thing you said to me Wednesday last [May 7] has been running through my head ever since. It must go into the veto. In speaking of the cry of no troops at the polls, etc., you said "to enforce the laws under any circumstances. What an idea—that the polls, places sacred to peace and quiet, should be the only places in the country where crime is to be permitted, and the laws not to be enforced." "Sanctuaries for crime." You said it better than I state it. I mean in clearer language; no one ever said it before to my knowledge, and no one could say it better. It rings like metal.

Truly, T. D.

[Washington, D.C., Monday] May 12, 1879. 2 P.M.—President Hayes sent in the veto. Dispatches of this day say that the Republicans in Congress were disposed to go for the bill until their attention was called to its dangers by an eminent member of the Cabinet. Bosh. McCrary, Secretary of War, was in favor of the President approving the bill up to Thursday morning, May 8; Hawley went to him and found this to be so. Evarts was openly engaged in betraying the Republicans. What was it? All bosh. Evarts told a personal friend, a newspaper man, this himself.

[Washington, D.C., Thursday] May 15, 1879.—I asked Webb Hayes to-night at the Executive Mansion if he [had] received my letter of last Sunday, May 11. He said that he saw it Monday noon lying on his father’s table opened, but it had come too late as the veto message was written and signed by the President Sunday evening. The sentence would keep for the next veto, he said.

Washington, D.C., [Friday] May 16th, 1879.—The Veto of the army bill which President Hayes sent in May 12, 1879, has completely demoralized the Democrats. It was written by the President himself and signed last Sunday. The bill which he vetoed was drawn up by Senator A[llen] G. Thurman, and was a most cunning one. The Democrats, until the arrival of the veto, supposed that the President would approve the bill. Probably some of his Cabinet had misled them.

The veto went into the House about 2 P.M. The Republicans were very cautious as to the President; and the Democrats, heartily hating him but expecting some political comfort, became very quiet as his Private Secretary, under escort of a doorkeeper, called to the Speaker: "The President of the United States transmits to the House of Representatives a message in writing." Under the Constitution a veto [message] must receive immediate consideration, so the clerk began to read the message. The House was very quiet. At one sentence the Democrats gave slight applause, but in an instant the message refuted the Democratic party’s declarations as to the question and stated the Republican party’s view to be the correct one. Then the Republicans began to applaud and kept it up until the message closed, when there was a cheer. The Democrats were completely routed and many of them wanted to go home. This extra session was forced by non action at the last session on the army bill at the instigation of the Blackburn men of the House, who believed that an extra session, called immediately after March 4, 1879, would result in the defeat of Mr. Randall for Speaker. (Mr. Randall had told me that he could see no use for an extra session; and also denounced the anti-Chinese business as bosh and clap trap, and stated that he believed many men in the House who voted to pass it over [the President’s] veto were glad it had failed.).

On the morning of the 3d of March, 1879, I went to the White House at the request of Mr. Randall to urge an early call for an extra session. The President agreed that it ought to be early, and named the 24th of March; but the next day he made it the 18th. I saw him at 11 A.M. and he told me it would be the 18th. Of course I did not intimate that Mr. Randall wanted it. There need not have been any extra session but for the desire of certain Democrats to defeat Mr. Randall. Now that they have the extra session, the President vetoes all their political acts, showing by his messages the absurdities of their claims for the necessity of legislation for the protection of voters at the polls from the army. The people at large are laughing at them and they are powerless. Now they must do or find something expedient to give excuse for this extra session; they really cannot and so are incensed.

Most of the sensible men of the Democratic party are disgusted. The result will be that the Republican party will win all elections North this year and the Presidency. Ben. LeFevre, Member of Congress from Ohio, told me to-day that they would be here all summer and until the regular session in December. Mr. J[ohn] D[eWitt] C[linton] Atkins, Democrat of Tennessee, chairman of the appropriations committee, is against all this party maneuver and with Mr. Erastus Wells, M.C. of St. Louis, will vote with the Republican members of the Appropriations Committee to report favorably the appropriations bills. Mr. Wells, Democrat, told General Hawley yesterday that the whole thing was a farce and a humbug and he wanted to adjourn and go home; that the bill and scheme to entrap Hayes was gotten up by a vulgar old whiskey tub in the Senate, and he was disgusted with his own people. The President informed me Friday morning that he had been told by Democrats at his own table that they would bolt and go with the Republicans on this issue.

The Republicans are solid with President Hayes now and the lines are formed for 1880. The Democrats are utterly hopeless and totally defeated and routed. They have not even held a caucus since the veto, to know what to do or to lay out party action. The Northern Democrats are afraid of the hot talk of the Southern Democratic members. Republicans are everywhere jubilant and exultant. The veto is praised by everybody. It is undoubtedly one of the ablest political vetoes sent to Congress in many years.

Washington, D.C., [Thursday] May 29, 1879.—From two until three to-day I was at the White House with President Hayes. He laughed at my sending him a collection of [Andrew] Jackson’s veto medals the night before, and said he would get a small case for them. His veto [of "An Act Making Appropriations for the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Expenses of the Government"] had just gone up to the House.

We spoke of the nomination of Charles Foster for Governor, and Andrew Hickenlooper for Lieutenant Governor of Ohio. He was much pleased with the nomination of Foster, and said: "After all, Taft is not the man to run for Governor; he is vulnerable as to his religious decisions while Judge, and he is a heavy, cloggy speaker; give him time to prepare and write out a labored effort and he is all right. Foster will be strong with the mass of the people; he is a great mixer with them. Many years ago Hickenlooper, while United States Marshal of the Southern District of Ohio (Gen’l Grant obtained his nomination) was not satisfactory in his politics; he went over to the Greeley set." The President showed no love for Taft.

Gov. Hayes got President Grant to appoint Dr. William B. Thrall, who had been his private secretary, to succeed Hickenlooper.

While I was with the President, Webb Hayes came in from the House where he had been with the message vetoing the Legislative, Judicial & Executive appropriation bill, and said that it was received by the Democrats with irony, laughter, and derision, and with applause by the Republicans. Webb also mentioned the vote on it.

The President went out of the room for a few minutes during the prior part of the interview, and I sat in his room with Gusten [George A. Gustin], the private stenographer, waiting for him. Charles Loeffler, the door keeper, came in to see me. Gusten talked about Evart’s cheek and presumption, and I called attention to the article in the Philadelphia Press of the 27th or 28th of April, 1879, from D. B. DeKeim who was the Boswell to Evarts, wherein Evarts claimed to be entitled to the Republican nomination in 1880, because he had brought about amicable relations between the President and his party (a falsehood, or course). Loeffler said, "I saw it." I then stated that it was claimed by Evarts’ friends that he wrote the veto messages of the last month. Gusten said, "Why, the President wrote all three himself, and no man saw them except him and me. He handed me the notes of them and I copied them."

I asked if they had been shown to the Cabinet, and he said they were not. "They were printed for the President, and copies sent from the Printing Office to the President, before the manuscript was sent to the House." With that Loeffler handed me a printed copy of the one just sent in, but not yet read. The sentence which I wrote the President in letter of May 11th or thereabouts, wherein the polls are to be made "sanctuary for [lawlessness and] crime," is in the message.

General J. R. Hawley told me yesterday afternoon, May 28th, that General J. A. Garfield, M.C., had been up to see the President two days before, and asked him to look about for a method of compromising with the Democrats in Congress. Hawley, who was present, said Hayes replied to Garfield that he, the President, had nothing to compromise, and that he was going right on. Garfield’s old weakness, lack of moral pluck, attacks him too often for his own good. Hayes said to him that he ought to be the last man to advise him this way.

I told the President that those who had been talking to him about compromise had no authority to speak for any but themselves; that he had the Democrats in full retreat and he should do well to keep kicking them. He explained to me the idea he had intended to convey by his three Veto messages. The first one was to show the necessity for retention of the laws to have fair elections; the second to define the law and constitution as to United States elections for Congressmen (and he believed that the Congressional elections should be held at a time different from State elections); and the last message was to resist encroachments by the Congress on the Executive functions.

I spoke of Ben Hill’s course in the Senate. "Yes," the President said, "Hill has been very erratic."

I went from the "White House" to Speaker Randall’s room in the Capital. Mr. Randall, R. W. Townshend, M.C. of Illinois, Julius McElhone, official stenographer of the House [official Reporter of Debates], and another Member of Congress were present. J[ohn] H. White, Randall’s Secretary, said "Look here, Donaldson, every time you come here your friend Hayes plays thunder." Randall said, "What is your man going to do next? The idea of his lecturing this House on fraud! by his last veto message! You should have heard our fellows laugh. Fraud rebuking fraud!" The man whom I did not know (M.C.) said: "I suppose the reason Hayes did not send the message in before was that the fellow that writes them for him was out of town." I answered, "You are mistaken; he writes every one of them himself." They were surprised, and Mr. Randall said, "You can rely on this for Donaldson knows."

Randall asked me to-day if Hayes was an educated man—a strange question. It is odd that the public men about Washington always believe that the Presidents’ messages are not written by the Presidents. The fact is that in experience the Presidents, both Hayes and Grant, always wrote their own messages, sometimes consulting the head of the Department directly interested. It is astonishing how little of the "Off with his head" there is in Government. The most solemn and portentous acts are done by the men who handle affairs in the simplest manner. Doing the little things well makes great acts.

Mr. Townshend, M.C. of Illinois said: "Mr. Randall, that d—d Secretary of War McCrary has refused to appoint a Democrat on the visiting Board to West Point this year. Have you appointed a Republican?" "Yes," said Randall, "I appointed [Eugene] Hale of Maine last Congress." Townshend said, "Well, I would like to have you retaliate on that damned fellow and not appoint a Republican." After he went out, Randall remarked to me, "That is a great man because some one else did what he considers a mean thing. He wants me to do one also; what an idea!"

I told him (Randall) that his party had better pass the bills and appropriations, and go home. The fact is they do not know what to do.

(Townshend died in 1889; Randall in 1890; McElhone in 1891).

Coming from Washington to-night on the cars, I rode with General H[enry] H[arrison] Bingham, Member of Congress, 1st District of Pennsylvania. I mentioned the ["]Evarts named for President["] matter in the Philadelphia Press of the 27th and 28th inst., by D. B. DeKeim. Bingham laughed and said: "The fun of it is that DeKeim told me that Evarts got him to put the article in the Press, or rather gave him the points, and then said DeKeim, ‘Gave Sherman a punch in the ribs at the same time.’"

This article is the one referred to in the conversation with President Hayes. It suggested that Evarts had given the Democrats in Congress the idea that Pres’t. Hayes would approve all the bills which he [subsequently] vetoed.

"In fact," said Bingham, "He told me so."

Washington, D.C., [Tuesday] June 3, 1879.—I spent this evening with President Hayes. He was pleasant and chatted of old times. We turned upon books. He wrote out a list for me to buy for him for his children: Munchausen, beautifully illustrated; Peter Parley; Robinson Crusoe; Swiss Family Robinson; and White Captive.

He detailed to me his early reading, and of his recent unsuccessful hunt for a small book of Indian romance on the Texas border in say 1835 or 1836. He offered Robert Clarke $25 for a copy of it. It was a small volume brought from the East to the West by a relative and he had never seen it since. He had told the story to all of his children as they grew up, and referred to Webb who was present, who remembered the story. He also commissioned me to buy him a number of old books from time to time. He said a publisher once came to him many years ago and borrowed his copy of "Three Spaniards" [The Three Spaniards. A Romance, by George Walker], and republished it. He said he longed to get a run into the old book stores and get some books; wanted to do so badly in Washington, but it would not do; he was compelled to forego the pleasure.

Washington, D.C., [Wednesday] June 4, 1879.—I left Washington this evening with the Hon. D[aniel] J[ohnson] Morrell of Pa., the great Iron Master who works 6,000 men at the Cambria Iron Works, Johnstown Pa. He was in Congress two terms, 41st & 42nd Congresses, I think [March 4, 1867-March 3, 1871]. He told me how in 1868 as a member of the House he sat beside John Covode of Pa., M.C., in the Senate Chamber when the Senate vote on the articles of impeachment [of Andrew Johnson]. When the name of Senator [Edmund Gibson] Ross (Rep.) of Kansas was called, Ross unexpectedly voted "Not Guilty." Covode called out, "President Johnson is economical. He has bought the cheapest man in the Senate."

When Grant came in as President in 1869, he found that President Johnson had previously filled the Kansas offices with Ross men. Morrell was with Grant in his room when Ross came in to complain to Grant that he was turning all of Ross’s friends out of office in Kansas. Grant and all other Republicans considered that these offices given by Johnson were in part payment of Ross’s treachery to the Union. Ross said: "Mr. President, am I to understand that I am not to control the Kansas appointments?" Grant answered, "Yes; you are not to control the Kansas appointments." Ross became excited and swore roundly and, going out of the door, exclaimed, "We will see." Grant much amused, answered, "We will see." Ross was sat upon. (Ross was made Gov. of New Mexico in [May] 1885 by President Cleveland).

Some time in March, 1879, Morrell was in Washington. Having fifteen minutes to spare prior to the departure of his train, he called at the White House and sent in his card, and was admitted immediately. President Hayes took him into the Library and said, "Morrell, I want you to tell me, is the Republican party down on me or not; what do you say?" Morrell stammered out the truth, and told him frankly that he (Hayes) had lost the confidence of his party leaders and was accused of treachery. The President became very earnest and said: "Morrell, I am just as good a Republican as you or anybody else. I tried an experiment in Southern matters. It was a piece of policy, but it failed. The conciliation matters came to a bad end but I did it to bring all our people together. From this time on I intend to be Radical enough to suit our people."

Mr. Morrell told me that the impeachment speech delivered by John A. Logan, M.C. of Illinois was written by General Joe Holt, Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army, and that he (Morrell) knew it.

[Friday] June 13, 1879.—General Hawley told me this morning about the talk he had with D. W. Bartlett, Secretary of the Chinese Embassy. Bartlett said that the smallest matter of enquiry at the State Department was delayed for weeks; that the method of conducting the Department was a crying evil, and that all the foreign legations were loud in their complaints, especially Sir Edward Thornton. It was all promise and no performance.

Washington, D.C., [Saturday] June 14, 1879.—Mr. E. T. Steel this morning waited upon the President after seeing Mr. Seward in regard to the consulship at Ghent. The President remarked that there were at least 40 consuls in Europe that ought to be removed, 20 of them for drunkenness, and it was difficult [to] arrive at the truth in regard to consuls. For instance, the one at Rome (removed to make place for Eugene Schuvler within ten days past [nominated May 22; confirmed May 26, 1879]), complaints were being made constantly of this consul’s habits, drunkenness, etc. The matter was referred to Mr. Geo. P. Marsh, American Minister to Italy, who reported in favor of the consul; that his habits were good, etc. Upon proof, however, the President removed him. The President said, "If our friends up at the other end (meaning Congress) were a little more liberal we could find out about these things." This referred to the fact that although Congress was frequently asked to appropriate a small sum for expenses of a consular agent to go abroad and investigate consulates, as one did under Grant, Congress refused to do so.

Philadelphia, Pa., [Friday] June 20, 1879.—An editorial in the New York World gives reasons for the extra session of the Forty-Sixth Congress. Not a word of it is true. The conferees on the Army bill in the House, two Democrats [J.D.C.] Atkins and [Milton J.] Durham and [Charles] Foster, Republican, being the third, and the conferences on behalf of the Senate, two Republicans and [James B] Beck, Democrat, fixed the thing or made an extra session necessary by a failure to agree at the last minute. J.C.S. Blackburn and his friends insisted upon an extra session so as to beat or defeat Randall for Speaker of the Forty-Sixth Congress. Randall finally thought also that an immediate extra session, if there was to be one, was better for his chances as Speaker. Still he was not really in favor of an extra session. When it was determined upon, Robert Randall came to see me and said that Sam [Randall] wanted to see me. I went at once to his private room. I think this was on Sunday, March 2d, 1879, in the afternoon. He went right to business. He wanted the extra session as soon as possible and desired the President to call it at once. The next day, Monday at 10 A.M. (there had been a dreadful snow storm Sunday night), I went to the President and talked the thing over. The President finally said: "Well, let us call it for the 24th of March, if we have to have it; that is twenty days." I said to him that if there was any leverage to be given anybody among the Democrats, it should be to Randall. To this he agreed. That afternoon I told Mr. Randall, who was much pleased. Of course, this was all a secret. Tuesday, March 4, at 11:30, I saw the President at his room in the Capitol. He asked me if there was any hope of the passage of the Army bill. I answered, "I am informed not." He then agreed that the extra session should be March 18th.

Washington, D.C., [Tuesday] June 24, 1879.—The President mentioned to me to-night that he had made a battle in the Commission in charge of the Washington Monument for no change in the original plan. It was a hard fight, and to him is due the credit of continuing the work as originally started, an obelisk.

I spent an hour (from 9 to 10 P.M.) with the President and Webb Hayes. We sat on the back porch overlooking the river. The President discussed politics generally. He was good natured and felt well at the prospects of another chance to veto a bill for the Democracy. He asked me why Mr. Blaine had gone home. I answered owing to his health and the heat of the weather. I did not in fact remember that the Republican State Convention met at Augusta [Bangor] on the 26th instant.

I gave it as my idea that the best reason why the Republicans in the Senate had opposed the Army bill while the Republicans in the House had favored it and the President had signed it, was because there was in it a clause relating to free telegraphy which General B. F. Butler of the last House had inserted, which Senators thought unconstitutional and violated private rights, or rather, destructive of the vested rights of existing telegraph companies. The President said he had recently heard the same thing.

He called to Webb, "Go and show Tom the owl that nearly threw down the Washington Monument." We went into the library and saw the bird. It was a stuffed owl, which had been given to the President by the engineer in charge of the monument a few days before.

After we returned to the porch, the President then told me the story of the owl’s attempted destruction of the Monument. There had been for several months a discussion between rival engineers as to whether the present foundations of the monument were strong enough to warrant the continuation of the proposed tall shaft. Vibration of an alarming degree was spoken of. The engineer in charge suspended from the center of the shaft a wire with an iron bob attached, as a plumb. The iron bob was placed in a basin of molasses, a dense fluid which would prevent atmospheric wavering. Just above the iron bob was placed two cross pieces of wood with pencil points resting on sheets of paper below; when the wire vibrated the pencil points on the wooden arms marked it on the paper. For several weeks the results were very satisfactory. One morning, a week or so ago, the engineer who at stated periods beginning early in the morning, watched closely for vibratory marks, came running out crying that the monument was going to fall. The pencil marks ran in every direction; the monument would soon be off the line of perpendicular. The President and Board were notified. Examination showed that the line had swung about in an alarming manner, as shown by the pencil marks on the paper. Investigation was made at once. Near the top of the shaft was found this owl held fast in the wire. His struggle to get free had vibrated the wire and caused the wild marks. The owl was taken, killed, stuffed and presented to the President.

Washington, D.C., [Thursday] June 26, 1879.—I went to the White House this evening with General J. R. Hawley to have a talk with the President. He was on the back porch. Amos Townsend, Member of Congress from Ohio, and Webb Hayes were there. Hawley took out a cigar to smoke and regretted that he had no more. The President said: "Smoke away. Webb, have you some cigars?" Webb said: "We are all out." General J. W. Keifer came in within a few minutes, and a running chat and discussion was kept up as to the policy of an extra session. I asked why it was that Nicholas Muller, M.C. (Democrat) of New York (a very large fat man, say of 300 pounds and fine looking withal, and a Commissioner of Emigration under the State of New York), was always walking around the House during the session. He was constantly on his feet. Some one said he was a brewer. "That accounts for it," said Hawley; "There is so much drinking around the House that Muller, from the fumes, thinks that he is walking around the beer vats in his brewery."

Muller has an idea he was handsome and always eyed the gallery to see if the ladies were looking. There was a Deputy Sergeant at Arms during the Forty-fifth and Forty-sixth Congresses that sickened all observers by his vain attempts from the House floor to attract the ladies in the gallery.

The President talked politics for an hour and primed General Hawley for a five minute speech the next day on the Judicial Bill. It was good talk and Hawley in the House next day made a telling speech [on H.R.No. 2382, "Making Appropriation to Pay Fees of United States Marshals and Their General Deputies"]. As we walked down the street Hawley said to me: "Hayes understands politics better than I imagined." The President said to me before we left, "I wonder if the Committee from Congress will wait upon me at the close of the session, as is usual." "I don’t know," I said. He quickly replied: "If they do or do not I am going to my room near the S